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Measurement of Income with Time Use
with Applications to Hedonic Indicators of Happiness and Misery 1
William Nordhaus

I. Measures of Time Use and Social Indicators
A. Time Use in National Accounting
How should time use be included in our accounting frameworks. Traditional
economic accounts center primarily on market transactions. But much of economic
activity, and in all likelihood much of economic welfare, depends upon activities outside
of the market place. Moreover, although we do not yet have economic accounts that
incorporate the use of time, it is plausible that the economic value of time is the most
important single non-market input, and perhaps also non-market output.
I will consider three issues relating to the use of time in this essay. First, how
might we integrate time into our economic accounts? Second, are attempts to use
hedonic psychology likely to be a fruitful way of valuing time in our economic accounts?
Third, do measures of emotions have the property of “interpersonal cardinality” that is
required to construct quantitative social indicators?
To begin with, it is worth reflecting on the importance of time use for non-market
economic activity. Non-market activity consists of activities like education, recreation
and other uses of leisure time, babysitting, home production of laundry and similar
services, along with work-related activities like commuting. The inputs into these
activities consist of non-market and market labor, capital services, and material inputs.
By far the largest inputs for non-market activity are labor (time). Indeed, virtually the
entire value added of the non-market sectors comes from time inputs, while most of the
non-time inputs are purchased in the market economy.
Consider the cost of home production (such as doing the laundry). The total value of
such activities consists of the value of purchased market inputs (soap, washing
machines, electricity, and the like) plus the value of the time spent in the activities. For
This is a preliminary version of a paper presented to the NBER Workshop on Time Use. The
author is grateful to many participants, particularly Alan Krueger, for comments.
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example, doing the family laundry might have total cost of $21, of which $20 (1 hour ×
$20 per hour) is the value of the time, while $1 is the cost of the soap and washingmachine services. Virtually all the non-market inputs are likely to be time.
The same story holds for virtually every non-market activity: the major non-market
input is labor. The one important exception might be the inputs of non-market
environmental capital (clean air, clean water, public beaches) that enter into recreation
and health activities. These examples suggest that measuring and valuing time use may
be the most important single component of non-market accounts.
Up to recently, the United States had been particularly laggard with respect to
generating comprehensive and periodic time-use statistics. Fortunately, beginning in
2003, the Bureau of Labor Statistics began the collection of a large time-use survey for the
United States (the American Time Use Survey, or ATUS). 2 In the latest survey year, 2006,
this survey interviewed 13,000 households annually from the out-rotating panel of the
Current Population Survey. It is currently the only time-use survey in the world to be
conducted on a continuous basis. The ATUS will be an important addition to the U.S.
statistical system and a crucial ingredient in the future construction of augmented
accounts. In addition, there are now harmonized historical data on time use, such as the
American Heritage Time Use Study (AHTUS). 3 The time of time-use studies has arrived.
B. Two Approaches to Quantitative Indicators on Time Use
In developing quantitative social indicators to integrate time use, we can consider
two fundamentally different approaches. The first approach would be to use the
methodology of national economic accounting. This approach, which has been
considered in the literature on augmented and non-market accounts, would add the
“consumption and production of time” to the accounts. To implement this strategy, we
would need to develop a set of prices or values to weight the time consumptions, after
which time could be added to apples and pears using the standard methodology of
economic accounts. As I will indicate in the first part of this study, while this approach
would conform to standards of national economic accounting, the data requirements are
both theoretically and practically far beyond what is currently available.

2

A review of the BLS time-use survey is contained at http://www.bls.gov/atus/home.htm .
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A second approach, which has developed along a parallel track with an entirely
different approach to valuation, is in the spirit of emotions research. This would include
overall measures of emotions, such as happiness and misery; it might also attach
emotions to particular activities, such as unemployment or the time spent watching
television. This approach was pioneered by F. Thomas Juster and is followed in the
study by Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and
Arthur A. Stone (hereafter KKSSS). 4 This approach uses a completely different approach
to measuring the values associated with time uses – one based on surveys or other
psychometric measurements. The second part of this study addresses the potential for
use of hedonic psychology and emotions research in constructing quantitative social
indicators.
II. Time Accounts Using the Approach of National Economic Accounting
This section examines the incorporation of time use into the standard national
economic accounts. It derives equilibrium conditions for consumer behavior with market
and non-market consumption along with process or intrinsic values of time in different
activities. (“Process values” or “intrinsic values” are terms that are used to represent the
preference value of the time itself rather than the things produced by time.) Using a
standard index-number approach, we show that a full set of accounts has data
requirements that are far beyond those that are currently or prospectively available, with
problems particularly arising for the valuation of time and for measuring technological
change for non-market consumption and use of time. However, in a simplified case, we
show that the growth of real income can be approximated by a weighted average of
productivity growth rates in market and non-market productivity and that the valuation
of hours drops out of the formula. We examine the case of a representative consumer.
Further difficult issues, such as aggregation of diverse individuals or households, are
discussed briefly.
A. Consumer Preferences and Equilibrium Conditions

F. Thomas Juster, “Preferences for Work and Leisure,” in F.T. Juster and F.P. Stafford, eds.,
Time, Goods, and Well-being. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, 1985, pp. 333-51; Alan B.
Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, “National
Time Accounting: The Currency of Life,” paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Time Use Conference, December 7-8, 2007.
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I begin with a standard analysis of how consumers allocate their time and choose
consumption. For this purpose, I assume that preferences are time-separable and
examine the ith consumer deciding at time t. The consumer can choose to work in the
market and buy market goods; work at home and produce home goods; and use time to
enjoy leisure or non-work activities. In general, we separate time used in home
production from leisure by the definition that the time used in home production can be
substituted for by the time of others (such as washing dishes), while the activities in
leisure cannot be produced by others (such as playing golf).
We begin with the determinants of consumer choice as represented by a standard
ordinal preference function. (I call this a “preference function” instead of a “utility
function” to reserve the latter for the psychological hedonics below.) W is an ordinal
index that represents more preferred combinations of bundles as higher values, while U
is a standard preference function for individual i at time t.

(1)

m m
nm nm
l
l
Wi , t = U ( c im, t , c inm
, t , B i, t h i, t, B i, t h i, t , B i, t h i, t

)

where
c im, t = market consumption,
c inm
, t = home consumption,
h im
, t = market hours,
h inm
, t = home work hours,
h li, t = leisure and non - work time,
B im, t = technological change in market time
B nm
i, t = technological change in non - market time,
B li, t = technological change in leisure.
This formulation is unusual in the literature on time use in specifically
incorporating a process value or intrinsic value of time. It is also novel in allowing for
the possibility of technological change that makes time spent more or less pleasant. This
specification recognizes that “leisure time” is generally an input into a technology that
produces the desired experience. For example, “listening to music” involves not only
time but also complementary inputs such as equipment, space, background noise, and
performance quality. Some time may be experienced as unpleasant (such as in dental
-4-

surgery) but these are nowhere as unpleasant as before anesthetics. Some examples
would be the development of technologies that make work more pleasant (such as
ventilation or air conditioning of factories), that make home work more pleasant (such as
dishwashers), and that make leisure more pleasant (such as improved television sets).
The point is that technologies can make non-market time more productive (by using
machines rather than hand washing), but technologies can also make the experiences
themselves more preferred. Of course, as in the case of air travel or airline food, time
spent can also become more unpleasant.
Note that the preference function in (1) is not separable over activities. Most work
on estimating the process value of time, going back to Juster and continuing with KKSSS,
assumes that the preference function is to be separable across different time uses. 5 This
assumption has been viewed as inappropriate and incompatible with empirical evidence
in preference theory for many decades and is especially objectionable for time use (we
discuss this point further below). 6
The consumer has three constraints: an income constraint relating to market
consumption, a home production function relating home work and home consumption,
and a time budget. The analysis uses a skeletal model that strips away inessential
elements. The first constraint is that market consumption equals a fixed element (fringe
benefits plus property income plus net transfers) plus market hours times the marginal
wage:

(2)

c im, t = I i , t + w im, t h im, t

We simplify the analysis by assuming that there are no lump-sum elements and that
marginal compensation is proportional to the average productivity of market labor for
that individual,

w im, t = A im, t , so:

F. Thomas Juster, “Preferences for Work and Leisure,” in F.T. Juster and F.P. Stafford, eds.,
Time, Goods, and Well-being. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, 1985, pp. 333-51; Alan B.
Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, “National
Time Accounting: The Currency of Life,” paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Time Use Conference, December 7-8, 2007.

5

George Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. I,” The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 58,
no. 4, August 1950, pp. 307-327.

6
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c im, t = A im, t h im, t

(3)

Home production is given by the home production function:
nm nm
c inm
, t = A i , t hi , t

(4)
where

A inm
, t is the productivity of per hour worked of home production.

Finally, we have the time budget constraint:
l
h i , t = h im, t + h inm
,t + h i,t

(5)
Total time is

hi,t .

We assume that preferences and resources are intertemporally separable. This
assumption is purely for expositional convenience and does not change the
measurements or analysis. Maximizing the preference function subject to the budget
constraints yields the following two first-order conditions. In the balance of this
discussion, we suppress the i subscript where it is unnecessary.

(6)

∂U
= w t + B tm π 3, t − B tl π 5, t = 0
m
∂h t

(7)

∂U
= π 2, t A tnm + B tnm π 4, t − B tl π 5, t = 0
nm
∂h t
For notational convenience,

π k , t = U k , t U1, t is the marginal rate of substitution

between the kth argument of the preference function in (1) and market consumption,

U k , t = ∂ U ∂ x k is the derivative of U with respect to the kth elements, and the marginal
rates of substitution are time dated to recognize that the marginal preferences change
over time.
-6-

Equation (6) states that the marginal preference value of leisure should equal to
the net value of an hour in the market in producing goods. Equation (7) states that the
marginal preference value of leisure should equal the net value of an hour of home work
in producing home goods.
These conditions differ from standard practice in one major respect: Each
equilibrium condition recognizes that there may be process or intrinsic values of time in
different activities (market work and home work) and that these values therefore need to
be netted out in the calculation. Most analyses of time use assume that the marginal
preference value of work is equal in the market and at home and further assume a
homogeneous output. From these assumptions, we get the standard condition that the
productivity of home production equals the marginal post-tax wage. There are also
many unobservable variables in this approach, which will come back to haunt us when
we attempt to construct an empirical measure reflecting the underlying preference
function.
B. Measuring Real Income with Apples, Pears, and Hours
We now consider the question of how to measure real income when we include the
“consumption of time” along with consumption of goods and services – we want to add
apples, pears, and hours, so to speak. In developing an index in the absence of complete
data, the equilibrium conditions are necessary for developing the theory. 7
In this section, we are interested in devising a measure of “real income” that is the
analog of real income in the theory of income and prices. The concept underlying the
approach is Becker’s concept of “whole income.” 8 We begin by transforming the
preference function in (1) into an index of real whole income for individual i at time t:

(8)

nm
l l
R t = R ( c tm, c tnm, B tm h mt , B nm
t h t , Bt h t

)

The approach followed here follows the standard approach to the development of indexes of
real income and expenditures. See for example W. Erwin Diewert, “Index Numbers,” in J.
Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, Eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Volume 2,
Macmillan, London, 1987, pp. 767-780.

7

Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 75, No. 299,
Sept. 1965, pp. 493-517.
8
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The function R is an ordinal transformation of U such that, along the equilibrium
path, R is locally homothetic. This implies that the rate of growth of real income is
measured as:

(9)

g ( R t ) = s (c tm ) g (c tm ) + s (c tnm ) g (c tnm ) + s (h tm ) g ( B tm h tm )
+ s (h tnm ) g ( B tnm h tnm ) + s (h lt ) g ( B lt h lt )

In this equation,

g (⋅) is the proportional rate of growth of the element and s (⋅) is the

elasticity of the real income function with respect to that element. In a market context,
the elasticities are the expenditure shares of each element in whole income using the
market or preference prices of each element. The expenditure shares are defined as

s ( xk , t ) = π k , t xk , t

5

∑ π k , t xk , t . In this expression, x

k, t

k =1

π k , t = R k , t R 1, t = U k , t U1,t

is the kth element;

is the marginal rate of substitution between item k and

market consumption; item k represents the kth element in the preference or real-income
function; and subscripts k = 1 through 5 represent market consumption, non-market
consumption, market time, non-market time, and leisure time.
Note that for globally homothetic U functions, R is uniquely defined. Moreover,
this procedure assumes that U is a smooth function. If the U function is not globally
homothetic, R will depend upon the path of consumption and prices. This property is
shared with all superlative indexes.
There are different alternatives to aggregating indexes over individual consumers
to construct a social index. The usual index, following Robert Pollak, uses the approach
of the “plutocratic index” in which each (real) dollar is equally weighted. 9 This then
yields a growth rate in the total or national index that is simply the sum of the individual
indexes where the individual indexes are weighted by each individual’s share of total
consumption. We will omit this step for brevity and because it adds nothing important
in the current context.
C. The fundamental measurement problem

The concepts are discussed in Robert A. Pollak, ”The Consumer Price Index: A Research
Agenda and Three Proposals,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1998),
pp. 69-78.
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Our theory now collides with a fundamental measurement difficulty. Our
measure of the growth of real whole income requires measures of both the items in the
preference function as well as the marginal preference values. Only one of these, market
consumption, has comprehensive measures, although we now have reasonably complete
measures of hours for the U.S. since 2003. We have no reasonably accurate measures of
home consumption. Furthermore, we have no measures at all of the marginal rates of
substitution between time and market consumption (the

π k , t ). And we have no

measures of any of the technological variables outside the marketplace (the B kt ). In
other words, any attempt to measure whole income is doomed to failure for lack of
critical data.
D. A simplified measure of income growth
We can develop a substitute for the ideal growth index with some further
assumptions. First, we assume that there is no technological change in the technology of
k

time use. In other words, the B t = 1 for all k. Second, we assume that it is possible to
measure the productivity of non-market work. Denote variables with dots over them as
time derivatives. We then rewrite equation (9) as:

R t = c tm + π cnm, t c tnm + π hm, t h tm + π hnm, t h tnm + π hl , t h lt

(10)

We take the time derivatives of equations (3) and (4), obtaining:

(11)

c tm = w t h tm + w t h tm

(12)

nm
nm nm
c tnm = A nm
t ht + At ht

Substituting these into (10) yields
nm nm
R t = w t hm
t + π cnm , t A t h t + Ψ t

(13)
where

nm
l
Ψ t = h tm ( w tm + π hm, t ) + h nm
t ( π cnm, t A t + π hnm , t ) + π hl , t h t

-9-

From the first-order conditions in (6) and (7) and the time budget constraint in (4), we
have Ψ t

(14)

= 0 , which reduces the expression in (13) to
nm nm
R t = w t hm
t + π cnm , t A t h t

We then make one further simplification. We take the shares in equation (9) to be
the shares of whole consumption rather than whole income, where whole consumption
is equal to market plus non-market consumption. Substituting from (4) that the growth
in market income is

(15)

w tm / w tm = A mt / A mt , this implies that the growth in real income is:

nm
g ( R t ) = R t / R t = g ( A mt )σ (c tm ) + g ( A nm
t )σ (c t )

m
nm
where g ( A t ) and g ( A t ) are the rates of productivity growth in the market and the

non-market consumption sectors, and the weights are the shares of the two items in

( c tm + π tnm c tnm ) and
( c tm + π tnm c tnm ) .

m
m
whole consumption, σ (c t ) = c t

σ (c tnm ) = π tnm c tnm

We can get a slightly more intuitive result if we simplify further. Assume that the
marginal preference value of market work is equal to the marginal preference value of
home work and that the marginal product of home work is equal to the marginal
compensation of market work. These assumptions imply that the weights in (15) are
m
nm
proportional to h and h , which yields:

(16)

⎛ h mt
g ( R t ) = g ( A ) ⎜ m nm
⎜ht+ht
⎝
m
t

⎞
⎛ h nt m
nm
⎟⎟ + g ( A t ) ⎜⎜ m nm
⎠
⎝ht+ht

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

Equations (15) and (16) are the fundamental results. The simpler expression in
(16) states that the growth in real income is equal to the weighted growth of market and
home productivity, where the weights are the relative importance of market time and
home-work time. This is completely intuitive in emphasizing that the productivity of
non-market time is a key ingredient in economic welfare. The important and nonintuitive result in equations (15) and (16) is that the valuation of hours can be eliminated
from the equation for the growth of real income. Only the growth rates of productivity in
the two consumption sectors, and their shares, enter into the growth equation.
-10-

The correct growth rate would be slightly different if we made different
assumptions about differences in marginal preference values or relative productivities of
home production, but equation (16) provides the basic intuition. Note that the only
difference between (15) and (16) is the relative size of the weights.
The results depend upon strong assumptions, however. They require not only
that the consumer equilibrium conditions in (6) and (7) hold, but also that there is no
technological change in the enjoyment of time. While we might worry that these are
unrealistic, it is hard to imagine any series of measurements that could shed much light
on these issues.
How much does the growth in real income given in equation (16) differ from
conventional measures? According to the ATUS, time devoted to market and nonmarket work were approximately the same in 2003-2006 (3.5 hours per day for market
work v. 3.8 hours per day for non-market work). This indicates that the welfare
significance of productivity growth in non-market work is of the same order of
importance as productivity growth in market work. We have virtually no serious
research on the relative importance of market productivity growth as compared to home
productivity growth, so the relative importance of the two terms in the welfare equation
(16) is currently unknown.
E. Graphical approach
We can show the results graphically as follows. To derive the graphical results, we
simplify by assuming that the preference function is additively separable, so

(17)

Wt = U cm ( c tm ) + U cnm ( c tnm ) + U hm ( h tm ) + U hnm ( h tnm ) + U hl ( h lt

)

The U (i) are separable preference functions for each of the time elements in (1) (note
that this is a simplification and should not be used in practice). Define the net marginal
preference value of an hour of market work, home work, and leisure, respectively, as

N ( h m ) = U cm' ( c tm ) wt + U hm' ( h tm )
N ( h nm ) = U cnm' ( c tnm ) At + U hnm' ( h tnm )
MU ( hl ) = U hl' ( hl )
The equilibrium conditions are then

-11-

(18)

N ( h m ) = N ( h nm ) = MU ( hl )

Figure 1 shows a Jevons stick diagram for the allocation of time using separable
utility and using only two activities, market work and leisure. The downward sloping
line shows the net marginal preference value of market work, while the upward sloping
line shows the marginal preference value of leisure, with leisure measured leftward from
the right axis. At the equilibrium, E, the net marginal preference value of market work is
equalized to the marginal preference value of leisure time, with market work being the
segment WE and leisure time being the segment EZ.
III. Valuation Using Direct Measurement via Hedonic Psychology

A. What are we attempting to measure?
The first part of this analysis examined the development of quantitative valuation of
time use using the standard approach of national economic accounting and determined
that the standard account appears to have excessively demanding requirements for
valuation. We now examine the potential of the techniques of emotions research and
hedonic psychology to value time in different activities and to develop quantitative
social indicators.
Before discussing different approaches, we begin with some definitions of
different kinds of variables. Most functions in standard preference theory in economics
are individually ordinal. This indicates that these functions can be transformed by a
monotonic function and yield the same observable outcomes. In some economic
applications, such as behavior toward risk, functions are individually cardinal. This
indicates that the variable or function is unique up to a linear monotonic transformation
for each person. Both are individual in the sense that there is no method by which levels
can be compared across different individuals.
To serve as a quantitative social indicator, a function or variable must have a
cardinal scale that is meaningfully defined across individuals. I will call this
characteristic interpersonally cardinal. This means that the variable must have a uniquely
defined zero and a well-defined unit of increment, and there must be a method to
compare the values across individuals. This implies that the zero and the increment
must be stable across time and people and countries. 10 Consumption is an
This point can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that we are interested in
comparing the happiness of two groups, calculated as the average happiness of each group. (i)
Under an ordinal measure, there is no meaningful way of taking averages of indexes that simply
provide greater than or less than rankings. We might make Pareto rankings, as is done in welfare
10
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interpersonally cardinal variable because my personal consumption expenditures can be
added to yours as long as we respect the convention of using the same prices and
commodities; consumption has a natural zero and a natural unit of increment, and these
are comparable across individuals. Interpersonal cardinality has much tighter
constraints than personal cardinality, which in turn is stricter than ordinality. 11
The development of quantitative social indicators using measures of emotions such
as happiness using hedonic psychology could take three potential paths. We can think of
these as proceeding from least demanding to most demanding of the data and analytical
constructs.
A first approach, which is the spirit of the “macro-happiness” studies, including the
development of the U-index by KKSSS, has been to develop measures of the
instantaneous or average flow of emotions such as happiness, pain, and the like. These
are analogous to estimates of global mean temperature. They are measurements that are
not attached to particular causes or activities. A significant body of research is devoted
to this strategy, as is summarize by Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz in their overview
of a compendium of studies in their edited volume, Well-Being: 12
We are particularly hopeful that a scientific understanding of hedonic experience
will allow for the development of valid hedonic indicators that reflect the
pleasantness of life in the everyday experiences of people….To this end, we propose
that nations should begin monitoring pleasure and pain through on-line experience
economics, but these would continue to be ordinal measures. (ii) Assume that the happiness
scales are individually cardinal but not interpersonally cardinal across groups. The happiness
measures of group A are (1, 7) for an average of 4, while those of group B are (2, 4) for an average
of 3. Under the original scaling, group A is happier than group B. By individual cardinality, we
can add, say, 5 to each value in group B and maintain all observable functions of the variable.
After the rescaling, group B is happier than group A. (iii) Finally, assume that the scale is
interpersonally cardinal, and can be transformed only by a common scale variable, k. Then the
average value for A is always k4, which is always greater than group B’s k3.
These definitions from economics differ from those used in other areas. In psychology, a
cardinal scale is referred to as an “interval scale.” What is called interpersonally cardinal in this
paper is referred to as “ratio measurement” in psychology. The terminology in psychology
originated with S.S. Stevens, “On the theory of scales of measurement,” Science, 103, 1946, 677680. The related theory of measurement has over the last half-century sparked a fierce
controversy in psychology with virtually no counterpart in economics.
11

Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwartz, “Preface,” in Daniel Kahneman, Ed
Diener, and Norbert Schwartz, Eds., Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Russell
Sage Foundation, New York, 1999, pp. xi-xii.

12
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recording among samples of respondents to complement existing social indicators,
and to provide a more direct assessment of the final outcome about which people are
most concerned.
The second approach attempts to attribute emotions to particular causes or activities.
This is analogous to saying that global warming is due to the accumulation of
greenhouse gases. This brand of emotion research associates well-being with attributes
or activities such as inflation, unemployment, or per capita income. The KKSSS study,
like the work of Thomas Juster and John Robinson before it, attempts to associate
emotions with particular time-use activities. For example, the U-index of KKSSS relates
to whether the maximum of the negative emotions exceeds the maximum of the positive
emotions. The discussion below points to several difficulties that arise in attribution, for
example because the studies assume separability of time values over time and activities.
The third approach, which imbeds the analysis in the framework of national
economic accounts developed in the first part of this paper, would aim to estimate the
value of time as compared with other components of economic activity. The accounting
framework values the time using the marginal rates of substitution or marginal values of
time. This approach might be devoted to measuring the growth of whole income in
equation (9). This approach is the most demanding of the three because it requires
estimating marginal valuations of time relative to other economic activities such as
consumption of goods and services. It is possible that the psychometric approach could
estimate the marginal rates of substitution, but this approach has not been pursued
partly because of lack of interest and partly because of lack of data.

B. Some difficulties with the hedonic approach
Most of the measures developed in the three approaches described above assume
that the magnitudes are interpersonally cardinal. Economists have come to regard
cardinal measures of utility with suspicion. As Paul Samuelson summarized: 13
With ever fewer exceptions, modern economic theorists believe that … everything of
interest and relevance in [the nonstochastic theory of consumer preference] can be
expressed in purely ordinal terms.

Paul A. Samuelson, “Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom,” Econometrica, vol. 20,
no. 4, Oct. 1952, pp. 670-678 at p. 670.
13
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I review several issues that arise in the application of hedonic measurements in the
construction of quantitative indicators both generally and specifically as applied to time
use. The fundamental problem can be easily summarized. Most measures in emotions
research can best be described as ordinal, and few or none would seem to be
interpersonally cardinal in the sense defined above. Statistical operations (such as
averages over space or time) on ordinal variables are not invariant to monotonic
transformations of the variables. We will therefore get different answers depending
upon the scaling of our measures. This implies that these variables are not useful as
quantitative social indicators.
a. Difficulties in measuring marginal values
The first issue arises when we attempt to put valuations on time in the context of
“utility analysis” or “preference analysis.” What are we attempting to measure with our
indexes of emotion or happiness? Are we trying to test whether the equilibrium
conditions for utility maximization are met? Or, are we attempting to estimate the total
or average of the emotional values for each activity (the total is the area under the
different marginal value curves and above some zero level of time in Figure 1)?
Begin with the question of using hedonic measures to measure the equilibrium
values of time, such as those that are needed for equations (5) and (6). (It should be
emphasized that this has not been the objective of much of the psychometric literature.)
This approach would be necessary to value the impact of policies or shocks that shift
time use among different activities. The problem, as in shown in Figure 2, is that it is
difficult to ensure that we are capturing equilibrium valuations in a slice-of-time
sampling methodology. The value of a time slice will be given by the point on the net
marginal value curves where the time slice is taken. We show four different slices: A and
B are ones where market work is sampled, while C is one where leisure is sampled,
while E is an hour that is just at the indifference point.
Even in the situation where we have perfectly resolved the issues of how to
measure process value – we have the perfect hedonimeter – we are almost certain to
capture above-equilibrium slices of time. It is very unlikely that we would get a slice at
exactly point E, which is the point at which the values of the marginal hours are
equalized. While many studies do not attempt to measure the equilibrium value, these
measures are the standard approach for evaluating policies or shocks that reallocate
hours among different uses for individuals who are making purposive use of their time.
b. The “zero problem” for total utility
-15-

Many studies of happiness are concerned with measuring total or average value or
utility from different uses of time. Attempting to measure total utility falls into the
conceptual morass called the “zero problem.” 14 Suppose that we want to measure the
total consumer surplus of water consumption in the national accounts. We then need to
integrate the marginal surpluses between some “zero” level and current consumption.
But what do we mean by zero? Is it literally zero water consumption (in which case
consumer surplus is equal to the value of life itself)? Or is it the level of consumption in
pre-industrial times? If the latter, should pre-industrial times relate to the 1700s, when
water in the U.S. was plentiful? Or to the time when humans first crossed the Bering
land bridge, when ice was plentiful but water was scarce? In time-use studies, should we
consider the surplus of time spent breathing? If so, would this include the first minute as
well as the marginal minute? If we attempt to measure total surpluses for necessities in
too many areas with low “zeroes,” we will undoubtedly find ourselves with multiple
infinities of the value of time.
c. Difficulties due to non-storability of time
While some studies of happiness and time use might limit themselves to pure
measurement, virtually every study goes on to attribute well-being to particular
activities or other determinants. The KKSSS study, for example, associates the U-index
with different time-use activities.
The next set of issues revolves around the difficulties of attributing time to
particular time-use activities because of an oversimplified set of assumptions. One
concern revolves around the fact that time is a non-storable commodity. In the analytical
section above, we assumed that time could be allocated to different activities without
regard to the time of day, week, or year. In reality, time is a heterogeneous commodity
rather than a homogeneous lump that can be allocated continuously over tasks. For
example, I have an implicit contract with Yale that I will teach intermediate
macroeconomics from 11:35 to 12:50 on a particular day. There is an important seminar
going on at the same time, but I cannot both teach in one place and be in the seminar
room at the same time. Some activities can be shifted over time, so that I can record the
News Hour on my DVR and “move” it over time. But I cannot move my time over time.

See William Nordhaus, “Principles of National Accounting for Nonmarket Accounts,” in Dale
W. Jorgenson, J. Steven Landefeld, and William D. Nordhaus, Eds., A New Architecture for the
U.S. National Accounts, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 143-160.
14
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If we consider time as a non-storable commodity, we would need to estimate the
time-use stick diagrams for each slice of time. In this respect, time is like electricity,
which also cannot be cheaply stored. We see wide variations in hourly electricity prices,
and there is no reason why time prices should not vary greatly as well. For individuals
facing rigid schedules (for work, school, meetings, and so forth), we could easily find
that marginal valuations are all over the map depending on the extent of “time crunch”
or “time glut.”
Treatment of non-storable time will lead to substantial complications in the analysis.
The activities need to be represented with the appropriate time-stamped constraints. For
example, work must start at 8:30 am, and commuting must take place in the time just
prior to the start of work. Peak time will have a higher shadow price. This implies that
any activity that is observed during peak times must have a high valuation. By contrast,
off-peak times will have a low valuation. We may see that something – like watching TV
– occurs in off-peak times and conclude that this is a low-value activity, whereas the
truth is that it is simply occurring in off-peak periods.
d. Difficulties due to simultaneous uses of time
A similar difficulty in attributing well-being to activities arises because time is very
often devoted to multiple purposes. We frequently encounter people talking on their cell
phone while walking; these are clearly two distinct and inseparable activities –
communicating while traveling. We might be listening to the radio while driving to
work. These are not isolated examples – simultaneous time use is pervasive.
Since little time-use research to date has been economic in its orientation, little
attention has been given to the problem of joint production in time use. We can
introduce simultaneous activities easily in the analytical apparatus of section II. Assume
that there is no technological change in time use and that there are n different kinds of
simultaneously enjoyed leisure time. Denote
the kth component of leisure time, where

π 5, k , t as the marginal preference value of

π 5,1, t is the marginal preference value of the

primary activity (perhaps measured by hedonic psychologists). The equilibrium
condition in equation (6) for the simultaneous time uses becomes:
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n

(19)

w t + π 3, t = π 5,1, t + ∑ π 5, k , t
k =2

This shows that if we identify only a single activity (activity k = 1), we might
misestimate the marginal value of the hour. The general supposition is that we exclude
many valuable non-market time-use activities, which would lead to biased estimates of
the value of non-market time.

e. Difficulties arising from non-separability of hedonic values
A final issue relating to separability – which can be thought of as the general case
involving time-separability and activity-separability – is that the emotional effects of
experiences have deep and potentially unfathomable patterns of substitution and
complementarity. So here again, attempting to attribute emotions to particular activities
may prove impossible.
For example, when we observe someone who reports “eating and drinking,” the
reported pleasures and pains are likely to depend upon the context and history as well
as companions and quality of the food. The following summary provides a cautionary
note on the difficulties of attaching experiential values to different activities as
summarized by Rozin: 15

• Sensory pleasure (especially culinary and sexual) is extremely contextdependent…
• Most sensory pleasure is experienced in the remembered or anticipated domains,
as opposed to the on-line (experienced) domain….
• Combinations of sensory pleasures do not obey any simple, hedonic algebra….It is
not clear what we would even want to say about the pleasure of listening to
Beethoven while eating our favorite food (and having a massage)….
• There is a large effect of experience on sensory pleasure. Hedonic shifts and
reversals are common.

Paul Rozin, “Preadaptation and the Puzzles and Properties of Pleasure,” in Daniel Kahneman,
Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwartz, Eds., Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Russell
Sage Foundation, New York, 1999, pp. 129.
15
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Note particularly the difficulty of defining the pleasure of simultaneous activities such as
eating and listening to music.
This finding is critical to the interpretation of time-use data. As noted above, most
studies examining the value of time, including the KKSSS study, rely centrally on the
assumption of separability of the preference function for different time uses. This
assumption is clearly unwarranted on the basis of empirical studies of the psychology of
sensory experiences. While additive utility was standard in the early years of the
development of demand theory, it was Edgeworth – an early proponent of psychometric
studies – who “destroyed this pleasant simplicity and specificity” when he wrote the
general non-separable utility function that we used in equation (1) and is now common
currency in economics. 16
It will be useful to recall why additive utility functions fell out of favor in economics.
To begin with, they were seen to be an unnecessary restriction. Moreover, on careful
examination, we see complements and substitutes everywhere – such as left shoes and
right shoes for the former or beef and chicken for the latter. Addictions are examples of
strong intertemporal complementarities that are well established in economics and
psychology. People are often embarrassed about eating alone in a restaurant, while
Robert Putnam has classified the activity of “bowling alone” as symptomatic of the
decline of social capital. While understanding dependences over time, space, and
activities is a challenging task for time-use research, measuring these relationships will
be necessary for the accurate attribution of emotions to particular activities.
C. The lack of interpersonal cardinality
The ambitious program of hedonic psychology is to construct measures of pain and
pleasure to complement existing quantitative social indicators. Can an index of
happiness (or misery, or more generally of emotions) can be constructed that would be a
meaningful social indicator. Is this even theoretically possible? I think not. 17

The quotation is from George Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. I,” The Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 58, no. 4, August 1950, pp. 307-327, at p. 322.

16

I do not discuss here whether such measures would be worthwhile social indicators, whether
this view of human aspirations is too impoverished to be interesting, or the many paradoxes that
arise in its interpretation. These issues have been widely debated in philosophical discussions of
utilitarianism, such as Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, Eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond,
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

17
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The basic difficulty is that measures of emotions are conceptually individually
ordinal, while interpersonal cardinality is needed to qualify as a meaningful quantitative
social indicator. Assume for purposes of discussion that we have developed a perfect
hedonimeter based on brain scanning, and further that we have accurate techniques that
map how brain images correspond to reported pain, pleasure, sadness, sweetness, or
other features of reported emotions. Perhaps we can even calibrate the level of pain or
frustration that would make me frown or grind my teeth. Would it make any sense to
add these together, or to average these emotions?
It makes no sense to use such measures of emotions as quantitative social
indicators because they are not interpersonally cardinal. We point to three difficulties in
existing approaches. 18 To begin with, it seems unlikely that we can define a condition
that would represent an unambiguous “zero” or “neutral” emotional state (other than
being dead, which is not appealing in this context). Because emotions are so contingent,
the zero point will vary with mood, circumstances, genetics, context, history, and
culture. Therefore, there is unlikely to be a natural zero point for happiness, misery,
pain, or other emotions.
Secondly, it is difficult to conceive of a natural unit of increment for emotions that
would apply across people. We cannot say how the incremental pleasure that Sam
experiences in eating a “delicious cheeseburger” compares with the incremental pain
that Helen experiences when she has a “bad headache.” 19 Therefore, it is difficult to see
how the increment of emotions can be calibrated across different individuals.
Third, many if not all measures of emotions do not have the characteristic of
cardinality; rather they are ordinal in the sense that a state is identified as being “more
painful” or “happier.”These are ordinal measures because any numerical index that we
construct based on the reported emotions can be “stretched” by a monotonic
transformation and provide the same information. Can we really say that Sam’s second
cheeseburger makes him twice as happy as the first, rather than four times as happy, or
log(2) times as happy? Moreover, they are likely to be individually ordinal in the sense
The discussion that follows is hardly original with the present author. It goes back at least to
Isaiah Berlin, “Utilitarianism” (unpublished, available at
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/index.htm).
18

The proponents of hedonic psychology are sensitive to this issue and make a case for a natural
zero point. The psychological evidence against a universal neutral point is reasonably
compelling, however. For example, whether a blue light is perceived as blue or green or neitherblue-nor-green will depend upon what the person saw just before the blue light.
19
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that we can stretch Sam’s cardinal emotion scale arbitrarily relative to Helen’s. Since the
individual reported emotions can be each mathematically stretched or transformed and
maintain the property of more pleasant or less pleasant, the increment and level of any
aggregate index will be arbitrary depending upon what individual transformations are
applied. This implies that we cannot generally construct either aggregate indexes of
emotions over individuals, or even indexes of emotions over time of the same
individual, in a way that the indexes represent a meaningful representation of the
changes of individuals.
An example will illustrate the point. Constructing an index of aggregate pain or
pleasure is similar to creating an aggregate index of the blueness of the Danube River. I
do not doubt that in some ideal world we can make measurements of the spatially
averaged wavelength of the light coming off the water. We might be able to measure the
physiological responses to particular wavelengths of light in different people. Moreover,
we could potentially correlate these physiological responses with how people describe
their experience: whether the river is “blue” or “deep blue,” or even so pleasurable as to
inspire a song about “the beautiful blue Danube.” However, it would make no sense to
construct a national index of “Blueness of the Danube River” that involved adding up
how individuals on a particular day report the experience of looking at the Danube
River. Nor would it make sense to have an index of “Blueness” that would go up or
down from day to day depending upon unemployment, inflation, or per capita income.
Neither blue rivers nor blue moods constitute a meaningful index of emotions because
they are not based on interpersonally cardinal variables.
The force of these criticisms will differ depending upon the exact details of the index
that is created. The most problematical indexes are ones that attempt to attribute
differences in happiness over time and people to particular causes. These would appear
to suffer from many of the criticisms discussed here.

The U-index of KKSSS would appear to avoid the difficulties of some happiness
indexes by its creation of an ordinal index. But, their procedure simply pushes the
difficulty into the background. To illustrate their procedure, we can simplify by
assuming that we measure a pain sub-index, P, and a happiness sub-index, H. Then
construct a net misery index, M, which equals 1 if P >H and equals 0 if H > P. While this
looks ordinal, it actually makes very strong assumptions about the sub-indexes. This
approach is equivalent to assuming that that there are interpersonally cardinal subindexes in an underlying preference function, U(P,H). The sub-indexes assume
interpersonal cardinality in the sense that the zeros must be the equivalent for each sub-21-

index [that is, U(0,H) = U(P,0) for all P and H]; and that the utility increments must be
equal for each numerical increment for each emotion [that is, ∂U ∂H = ∂U ∂P for every
point of the function where P = U]. Even with these strong assumptions, there is no
reason to assume that the U indexes would be interpersonally comparable either across
persons or for over time for individuals.
We leave the last word to the philosopher who launched the utilitarian revolution,
Jeremy Bentham. He expressed his own reservations about utility measurement as
follows: 20
`Tis in vain to speak of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to
be as distinct as they were before; one man's happiness will never be another
man's happiness; a gain of one man is no gain to another; you may as well
pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears, which after you had done that could not be
40 of anything but 20 of each just as there was before.

Quoted in George Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. I,” The Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 58, no. 4, August 1950, pp. 307-327, at pp. 309-310.
20
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Figure 1. Time-use equilibrium
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Figure 2. Valuation with the time-slice methodology
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